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CONSENT DECREES, THE ENLIGHTENMENT, AND 
THE "MODERN" SOCIAL CONTRACT: A CASE 
STUDY FROM BATES, OLMSTEAD, AND MAINE'S 
SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE 
Dana E. Prescott, Esq., LMSW 
I. INTRODUCTION TO A CASE STUDY 
On December 17, 2004, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law 
Court, issued its decision in Bates v. Department of Behavioral & Developmental 
Services, 1 which affirmed in part, and vacated in part, the decision of Superior Court 
Chief Justice Nancy Mills, and remanded for further proceedings in the so-called 
Augusta Mental Health Institute (AMHI) Consent Decree case.2 In the underlying 
litigation, patients at the mental health hospital filed motions for sanctions and findings 
of contempt alleging the State ofMaine failed to comply with the 1990 Consent Decree 
and incorporated settlement agreement. 3 After a seventeen-day trial on whether the 
State had substantially complied with the Consent Decree, Chief Justice Mills held the 
State in contempt and appointed a receiver to supervise and direct the day-to-day 
operations of AMHl. 4 
The State appealed on the grounds that the trial court's finding of contempt was 
an abuse of discretion and that the appointment of a receiver violated the separation 
of powers doctrine under Article III of the Maine Constitution. 5 Justice Alexander, on 
behalf of a unanimous Law Court, held that the determination of whether the State was 
in substantial compliance with the Consent Decree should have been made under a 
• Member, Prescott, Jamieson, Nelson & Murphy, LLC. The author wishes to thank Professors 
Charles S. Colgan and Elizabeth Kilbreth of the Muskie School of Public Service for providing the 
foundation for this article; Adam R. Prescott, Trinity College, for his contributions to its content; and 
student editors, Megan Goggins Sanders, Paul Greene, Lisa Chmelecki, and Nathaniel Bryans for their 
thoughtful comments and corrections. 
I. 2004 ME 154,863 A.2d 890. In 2004, through legislation, Behavioral and Developmental Services 
(BOS) and the Maine Department of Human Services (OHS) were merged into the Department of Health 
and Human Services (DHHS). Id. ,i I n. I, 863 A.2d at 890 n.1. 
2. In 2004, a new facility known as the Riverview Psychiatric Center replaced AMHI. Id. ,i I n.2, 863 
A.2d at 893 n.2. As this article went to print, Court Master Daniel Wathen approved a plan to end court 
control over Riverview Psychiatric Center and much of the mental health system. Gary Rema!, Mental 
Health Proposal Gets Court Approval, KENNEBEC JOURNAL, Oct. 17, 2006 at I, http://momingsentinel. 
mainetoday.com/news/local/3234413.shtml. 
3. Id. ,i 6,863 A.2d at 895. 
4. Part I of Chief Justice Mills's contempt and receivership appointment order may be found at Bates 
v. Duby, No. Civ. A. 89-088, 2003 WL 21921169 (Me. Super. Ct. May 23, 2003); Part II of Chief Justice 
Mills's order, Bates v. Duby, No. Civ. A. 89-088, slip op. at I (Me. Super. Ct. Sept. I 0, 2003), is available 
at http://www.courts.state.me.us/opinions/superior/2003%200pinions/ AMHIPartlIOp.pdf (last visited Oct. 
8, 2006). On December 2, 2003, Chief Justice Mills denied the State's motion for a stay of the receivership. 
Bates v. Burdick, No. Civ. A. 89-088, slip op. at 11 (Me. Super. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003). For the terms of the 
receivership see infra note 124. 
5. Bates v. Dep't of Behavioral & Developmental Servs., 2004 ME 154, ,i 2,863 A.2d at 894. 
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systems-based standard, regardless of whether the State had complied with individual 
aspects of the Consent Decree. 6 The court reasoned that though the State was in 
contempt, and irrespective ofits obligation to establish by agreement a comprehensive 
system of internal monitoring and evaluation to measure the State's progress in 
achieving goals, the trial court should have attempted less intrusive alternatives before 
appointing a receiver to operate AMHl. 7 Given that the trial court applied the wrong 
standard for determining "substantial compliance," the Law Court declined to address 
the separation of powers argument on appeal.8 
The history oflitigation involving AMHI, state government, and advocacy groups 
for the disabled parallels similar litigation around the country from the 1970s to the 
present. 9 As both the powerful and vulnerable members of American society sought 
judicial oversight of social welfare issues, 10 an extraordinary shift in traditional notions 
of the social contract between all three branches of government and its citizens was 
revealed. This shift from, at least, a cultural myth that there is a preference for 
representative government to the choice by the polis of a judicial theocracy, as a 
function of the delivery of social services, may well be part of the modern democratic 
process. Specifically, the Bates decision-a conservative response to the exercise of 
judicial power against the executive branch 11-provides a means of analyzing the 
separation of powers doctrine, as established by Articles 11112 and Vl 13 of the Maine 
Constitution, and the evolution of the social contract. Accordingly, the Law Court's 
refusal to enforce the AMHI settlement agreement in Bates, which contemplated court 
6. Id. ,i 3, 863 A.2d at 894. 
7. Id. W 74-75, 863 A.2d at 908-09. 
8. Id. ,i 85,863 A.2d at 911-12. 
9. See generally SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL, JOHN PARRY & BARBARA A. WEINER, THE MENTALLY 
DISABLED AND THE LAW (3d. ed. 1985); RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE 
OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (2005); NA THAN GLAZER, THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL POLICY 
(1988); James C. Harrington, Civil Rights, 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 367 (1997). 
I 0. "America has historically viewed as the deserving poor-older Americans, people with disabilities, 
and children." JERRY D. MARX, SOCIAL WELFARE: THE AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP 136 (2004). See 
generally Dep't of Human Servs., v. Shelnut, 772 So. 2d I 041 (Miss. 2000); Jefferson D.E. Smith & Steve 
P. Calandrillo, Forward to Fundamental Alteration: Addressing ADA Title III Integration Lawsuits After 
Olmstead v. L.C., 24 HARV. J.L. & Pue. POL'Y 695 (2001); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF 
JURISPRUDENCE (1990); BERYL A. RADIN, BEYOND MACHIAVELLI: POLICY ANALYSIS COMES OF AGE 
(2000); Lucille D. Wood, Note, Costs and the Right to Community-Based Treatment, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y 
REV. 501 (1998). 
11. See John C. Sheldon, The False Idolatry of Rules-Based Law, 56 ME. L. REV. 300, 300 (2004) 
("And although Brown [v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 453 (1954)) addressed only racial 
discrimination, it quickly became the basis for condemning many forms of discrimination, including race, 
religion, wealth, gender, age, and disability. What gave Brown this elasticity was its pragmatism, its faith 
in experience over logic.") 
12. ME. CONST. art ill, §§ I & 2 provide: 
Section I. Powers distributed. The powers of this government shall be divided into 
3 distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial. 
Section 2. To be kept separate. No person or persons, belonging to one of these 
departments, shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, 
except in the cases herein expressly directed or pennitted. 
13. Me. Const. art. VI, §1 provides: 
Section I. Courts. The judicial power of this State shall be vested in a Supreme 
Judicial Court, and such other courts as the Legislature shall from time to time establish. 
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appointment of a receiver in the event of breach, was an affirmative, and incorrect, 
answer to the constitutional question on which the court purportedly reserved decision. 
To explore the contours of this thesis, I will provide a brief history of the AMHI 
litigation in Part II. This will serve as a context for the discussion in Part III of the 
separation of powers doctrine and its Enlightenment roots in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Part IV will discuss the specific application of the separation of 
powers doctrine under the Maine Constitution from Maine's early statehood through 
the Bates decision. In this context, the functionalist test, as adopted under the Maine 
Constitution, defines the power and role of each branch of government and permits, in 
the unique circumstances of a consent decree, the appointment of a receiver without 
violating Article III. In Part V, I will address modem notions of public policy, social 
contract theory, and the delivery of equitable remedies to individuals with disabilities, 
who often do not have individual access to power. 
II. THE AMHI LmGA TION AS A CASE STUDY 
In Part I of Bates v. Duby, Chief Justice Mills reviewed, in 454 pages of detail, the 
faulty efforts of the State, its agents, and policymakers to comply with the Consent 
Decree. The Superior Court found, based upon clear and convincing evidence, 14 that 
the State had the ability to comply with the Consent Decree but ''wilfully ignored the 
Consent Decree or unilaterally amended its provisions without involving the court, 
Master, or plaintiffs." 15 As a remedy, the court exercised its equitable authority to 
appoint a receiver. 
The State contended on appeal to the Law Court that the Superior Court erred by 
finding the State in contempt, by misinterpreting the Consent Decree, and by mea-
suring substantial compliance in the context of whether the State met the needs of 
individual class members rather than by generally examining overall progress toward 
compliance with the settlement agreement goals and requirements. 16 The State asserted 
that the appointment of a receiver for AMHI exceeded the bounds of the court's 
discretion by violating the separation of powers clause under Article III of the Maine 
Constitution. 17 
A. An Unenlightened History 
In 1989, a group of patients filed a lawsuit against the State of Maine alleging that 
the State in its care, supervision, and provision of treatment services of present and 
former patients of AMHI was acting in violation of constitutional and statutory 
14. Under ME. R. CIV. P. 66, a finding of civil contempt requires clear and convincing evidence of the 
violation of a court order and a capacity to purge the contempt. 
15. Bates v. Duby, No. Civ. A. 89-088, slip op. at I (Me. Super. Ct. Sept. JO, 2003), available at 
http://www.courts.state.me.us/opinions/superior/2003%200pinions/AMH1Partll0p.pdf(last visited Oct. 
8, 2006). 
16. Bates v. Dep't of Behavioral & Developmental Servs., 2004 ME 154, ,r 2, 863 A.2d 890, 894. 
17. Id. This article will not address all forms and variations offederalism and separation of powers, 
such as the relationship of federal and state governments. These topics are covered in a plethora of 
literature. See, e.g., John H. Clough, Federalism: The Imprecise Calculus of Dual Sovereignty, 35 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. I (2001); Bruce G. Peabody & John D. Nugent, Toward a Unifying Theory of the 
Separation of Powers, 53 AM. U. L. REV. I (2003). 
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requirements. The Superior Court certified a class action, and on July 31, 1990, 
representatives of the parties entered into an extensive settlement agreement to resolve 
the litigation. A six-page Consent Decree, and a settlement agreement incorporated 
by reference, were approved by the Superior Court. The incorporated settlement 
agreement contained 303 numbered paragraphs divided into nineteen sections, and 
described each component of the system, its cost and funding sources, time lines for 
development or implementation, and the means whereby quality and effectiveness 
would be monitored and evaluated. The State was to provide an objective basis for 
measuring compliance and was required to develop a system of monitoring, evaluation, 
and quality assurance. A Master was then appointed to consult with plaintiffs and the 
State to develop a means of evaluating and measuring the State's compliance with the 
terms and principles of the agreement. 18 
By agreement of the parties to the Consent Decree and settlement agreement, the 
Superior Court retained jurisdiction over implementation until the provisions of the 
settlement were "'fully and faithfully implemented' at which point the settlement 
agreement would be dissolved." 19 As Chief Justice Mills noted, it "must be 
emphasized that through the Consent Decree, the parties themselves sought the court's 
supervision to remedy the serious problems that led to the 1989 lawsuit and the 1990 
Consent Decree. "20 
Shortly after the Consent Decree was approved, "Maine entered a prolonged 
period of fiscal crisis that required the executive and the legislative branches to 
institute difficult reductions in many State programs, including programs serving 
individuals with mental illness." 21 Nevertheless, plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt 
and enforcement in 1994. After a five-day hearing, Justice Chandler ruled against the 
State, finding that "funding was not the problem," but that a lack "of a concerted effort 
directed toward compliance with the Decree is the problem," and that the State was 
using financial difficulties as a noncompliance excuse.22 The court declined to hold 
the Governor in contempt as he was not personally "bound by the terms of the Consent 
Decree. "23 The Superior Court, however, found the State in contempt in eight separate 
areas. It ordered the State into compliance and to submit a plan to the Master by 
December 1, 1994.24 
In August 1995, plaintiffs filed a motion for an award of sanctions and contempt 
of the September 1994 order. 2s After a five-day hearing in March 1996, Justice Mills 
determined the State was in contempt of the 1994 order and proposed to appoint a 
receiver, but stayed that appointment to give the State an opportunity to comply with 
its specific obligations under the Consent Decree. 26 From 1996 to 2002, the parties 
18. Bates, 2004 ME l 54 fl 4-18, 863 A.2d at 894-96. 
19. Id. ,i 7,863 A.2d at 89S. 
20. Bates v. Duby, No. Civ. A. 89..088, slip op. at l (Me. Super. Ct. Sept. 10, 2003), available at 
http://www.courts.state.me.us/opinions/superior/2003%200pinions/AMHIPartilOp.pdf(1ast visited Oct. 
8, 2006). 
21. Bates, 2004 ME l54, ,I 19,863 A.2d at 897. 
22. Id. ,i 20,863 A.2d at 897. 
23. Id. ,i 22 n.3, 863 A.2d at 898 n.3. 
24. Id. fl 22-23, 863 A.2d at 898. 
2S. Id. ,i 24, 863 A.2d at 898. 
26. Id. 
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filed various plans for compliance and reports with the Master, who reported to the 
court. 27 The plaintiffs filed no additional motions for contempt. 28 In March 200 I, the 
State informed the court that it intended to file a notice of substantial compliance by 
the end of the year, but did not do so.29 The court, on its own initiative, moved to 
determine whether the State was in substantial compliance, and on January 25, 2002, 
the State filed a notice of substantial compliance pursuant to the Consent Decree. 30 
After a discussion between the parties and the court concerning what constituted 
"substantial compliance," 31 the court issued an order describing the positions to be 
discussed at the hearing: 
After a seventeen-day trial in 2003 on whether the State had "substantially complied" 
with the settlement agreement, Justice Mills issued an extensive and carefully 
considered order stating [the court's] finding and conclusions: (l) [the State] ha[d] 
developed a system that relegates non-class members with mental illness to second-
class status .... [S]uch a two-tiered system has not achieved substantial compliance 
by any standard; that system has failed; (2) forensic patients are merely warehoused 
at AMHI without treatment and discharge plans; (3) despite commitments in the 
settlement agreement to the contrary, patients who need hospitalization at AMHI are 
refused admission because it does not have the staff or beds to accept patients, and 
patients who are ready for discharge remain at AMHI because the workers and 
resources needed to support their living in the community [were] not available; (4) 
people who live in the community are not getting the services they need because the 
State has not identified their needs or developed resources to meet the needs; (5) 
crisis intervention services are inadequate; and (6) the State was not in substantial 
compliance with the agreement to develop a comprehensive plan for provision of 
mental health services.32 
Justice Mills specifically found that this was not a failure of funding, as money for 
Consent Decree purposes was consistently provided by the Legislature, but ''the failure 
of management to get the job done." 33 In Part II of its order, the Superior Court 
imposed a remedy for non-compliance by appointing a receiver for AMHI with all of 
the powers and authority usually invested in a superintendent as it relates to the duties 
and obligations under the Consent Decree. 34 
B. Bates, Olmstead and the Law Court 
On appeal, the Law Court addressed certain constitutional rights for individuals 
with mental illness, as well as the application of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), which was not enacted by Congress at the time of the original Consent Decree. 
In O/msteadv. L.C.,35 a plurality of the United States Supreme Court interpreted two 
27. Id. ,r 25,863 A.2d at 898. 
28. Id. fl 24-25, 863 A.2d at 898. 
29. Id. ,r 26, 863 A.2d at 898. 
30. Id. ,r 26, 863 A.2d at 898-99. 
31. Id. 
32. Id ,r 29, 863 A.2d at 899-900. 
33. Id. ,r 30, 863 A.2d at 900. 
34. Id. 
35. 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
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provisions of Title II of the ADA in the context of the State's obligation toward 
individuals with mental illness who are institutionalized and may qualify for 
community treatment programs. 36 The first provision was an "integration regulation," 
which precluded discrimination of a disabled person by unjustifiably placing and 
retaining that person in institutions rather than community-based treatment. 37 The 
second prescription was the "reasonable-modification" regulation, which required the 
State to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability but did not require measures that 
would "fundamentally alter" the nature of the State's programs. 38 
The individuals in Olmstead claimed that they were discriminated against because 
they remained confined to institutions after treatment professionals had determined that 
community-based treatment would be appropriate and community-based treatment was 
provided to other qualifying individuals within their class.39 The State of Georgia 
objected to additional expenditures for community-based treatment for all disabled 
persons as unreasonable given other demands on the State's budget. 40 In response to 
these competing interests, the Court opined in Olmstead that community-based 
treatment programs should be equally available to qualifying individuals without 
discrimination. 41 The Court also held that although the reasonableness of the State's 
allocation of resources need not respond to any individual client, the State must 
accommodate the needs of this class of persons with mental disabilities while balancing 
. resources available to the State.42 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas rejected the majority position that 
discrimination occurs when some members ofa particular group are treated differently 
from others members of that same group absent "a special definition supplied by 
Congress.',43 The dissent concluded, 
I fear that the majority's approach imposes significant federalism costs, directing 
States how to make decisions about their delivery of public services. We previously 
have recognized that constitutional principles offederalism erect limits on the Federal 
Government's ability to direct state officers or to interfere with the functions of state 
governments. 44 
Thus, Olmstead was the pretext for a much larger policy debate within the Court 
about the relationship of the federal and state governments. For Justice Thomas, the 
unremarkable proposition that discrimination leads to deleterious stereotyping is 
irrelevant because the majority improperly imposed a "standard of care" for the 
disabled by finding discrimination when the availability of dissimilar services occurs 
"merely" from the fact that different classes of people require different services, not 
from discrimination. 45 
36. Id. at 587. 
37. Id. at 592. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 593. 
40. Id. at 593-94. 
41. Id at 607. 
42. Id. 
43. Id at 623 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
44. Id. at 624. 
45. Id at 625. 
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As the Law Court observed in Bates when it accepted the reasoning in Olmstead, 
determining if the needs of a particular individual have been met would leave the State 
defenseless when an individual shows that he or she is qualified for a particular service 
or program. 46 The Law Court reasoned, "Any publicly funded health care system, even 
if adequately supported, may be viewed as inadequate when judged strictly from the 
perspective of an individual in need of services. Interpretation of the settlement 
agreement must recognize this reality." 47 Adapting Olmstead, the Law Court held that 
the case suggested a "broader system-based approach to measuring substantial 
compliance with the reasonable accommodation provision of the ADA. ... A system-
based approach to assessing substantial compliance with court orders or consent 
decrees in institutional reform cases has support in federal case law."48 
The meaning of this tautology in Bates must be read in the context of Olmstead. 
As the Law Court noted, 
a system-based standard for measuring substantial compliance would evaluate 
whether: (1) the State has identified the needs ofindividual class members, developed 
reasonably necessary resources to meet those needs, and addressed those needs in a 
timely manner; (2) the State is in substantial compliance with specific numerical goals 
and in reasonable compliance with the less objective goals and standards in the 
Consent Decree; and (3) the State's commitment of resources is reasonable, 
considering the State's many obligations, the responsibility the State has undertaken 
for the care and treatment of a large and diverse population of persons with mental 
illness, and the ultimate authority of the Legislature to raise and appropriate funds.49 
The Law Court goes on to further state that by applying this standard, 
substantial compliance could be achieved even if some individuals do not have all the 
services they need or want at all times. The provisions of the settlement agreement 
vary from broad goals to very specific numerical requirements. To evaluate 
compliance with settlement agreement provisions by determining whether selected 
class member's needs are being met sets the bar too high. For those broader 
provisions, where compliance with respect to every individual class member at all 
times is neither expected nor possible, the system-based method is the appropriate 
method to evaluate substantial compliance. For those provisions containing objec-
tive, numerical standards, stricter evaluation of compliance may be required. It must 
be remembered, however, that the court is measuring substantial compliance, not 
absolute compliance. so 
Of course, the factual findings of the trial court established that the State failed to 
accomplish compliance, substantial or otherwise, with the Consent Decree; thereby 
rendering it unlikely that the State could ever be compelled to comply under this 
"mixed use" test. Essentially, a finding of contempt has only symbolic meaning if the 
46. Bates v. Dep't of Behavioral & Developmental Servs., 2004 ME 154, ,i 72,863 A.2d 890,908 
(quoting Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603-04 (majority opinion)). 
47. Id 
48. Id. ,i 73, 863 A.2d at 908. 
49. Id. 'lJ 74,863 A.2d at 908-09. 
50. Id. ,Mi 74-75, 82,863 A.2d at 908-09, 91 I. 
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appropriate (and agreed upon) judicial remedy therefor violates the separation of 
powers doctrine. 
III. THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND COURTS OF JUSTICE 
A. Developing a Doctrine 
The doctrine of separation of powers is a political theory that dates as far back as 
ancient Greece. 51 The concept was refined by the framers of the U.S. Constitution and 
their contemporaries in Europe, and those refinements were, as is so often asserted, a 
product of the Enlightenment as it evolved in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
As Ian Shapiro succinctly stated in The Moral Foundation of Politics, if ''there is a 
single overarching idea shared in common by adherents to different strands of 
Enlightenment thinking, it is faith in the power of human reason to understand the true 
nature of our circumstances and ourselves. "52 In his treatise, Constitutiona/ism and the 
Separation of Powers, Professor M.J.C. Vile stated: 
Western institutional theorists have concerned themselves with the problem of 
ensuring that the exercise of governmental power, which is essential to the realization 
of the values of their societies, should be controlled in order that it should not be 
destructive of the values it was intended to promote. The great theme of the advo-
cates of constitutionalism, in contrast to either theorists of utopianism, or of 
absolutism, of the right or of the left, has been the frank acknowledgment of the role 
of government in society, linked with the determination to bring that government 
under control and to place limits on the exercise of power. Of the theories of 
government which have attempted to provide a solution to this dilemma, the doctrine 
of the separation of powers has, in modem times, been the most significant, both 
intellectually and in terms ofits influence upon institutional structures.53 
The Enlightenment profoundly changed mere theory to action after the seventeenth 
century when it was realized that legislatures also are subject to restriction "if 
individual freedom was not to be invaded; restricted not so much in the exercise of 
genuinely legislative function, but in their attempts to govern and so they interfere with 
the lives and property of individuals who displease the members of the legislature." 54 
As Vile noted, the development of courts of justice as assisting persons not members 
of parliament and with powers directed at particular individuals was 
[a] new and vitally important element, which resulted from the experience of the Long 
Parliament during the Civil War. The assertion of the generality oflaw is thousands 
51. See generally S.E. FINER, 3 THE HISTORY OF GoVERNMENT FROM THE EARLIEST IMES (I 997); 
M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 3 (2d. ed., Liberty Fund, 1998), 
available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/EBooksNile_0024.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2006); GoRDON S. 
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969); FRANCIS 0. WORMUTH, THE 
ORIGINS OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM ( 1949), available at http://www.constitution.org/cmt/wonnuth/ 
wonnuth.htrn (last visited Oct. 10, 2006). 
52. IAN SHAPIRO, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICS 7 (2003). It is this quest, elusive but 
necessary, for scientific and political truth that binds modem thought. See THE ENLIGHTENMENT: A 
SOURCEBOOK AND READER (Paul Hyland ed., 2003). 
53. VILE, supra note 51, at 3. 
54. Id. at 21 (emphasis in original). 
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of years old, but this was something more. Not only was law to be coached in general 
terms, but also the legislature must be restricted to the making oflaw, and not itself 
meddle with particular cases. This was indeed a major step in the development of the 
separation of powers. ss 
Thus, the doctrine of separation of powers in one form or another "emerged in 
England" as closely related to the theory of mixed govemment. 56 Some thirty years 
before the publication of Locke's Second Treatise, the doctrine "evolved as a response 
to the problems of the Civil War and the Commonwealth and had, in its seventeenth 
century formulation reached a high degree of development." 57 
The interrelationship of the powers of government may properly be considered one 
of the central considerations of Locke's theory. In his Second Treatise, Locke found 
the origin of the legislative and executive authority through those powers "man had in 
the state of nature." 58 The legislature had the authority to enact laws for the 
preservation of itself and others within the limits of ·the law of nature. The second 
power "in the state of.nature" was the power to punish crimes by the executive branch 
against the laws of nature. By developing a three-fold division of legislation, 
judgment, and execution, Locke remained true to a two-fold division of function and 
authority but the judiciary was not a part of that analysis.59 Locke simply did not 
formulate a separate judicial power alongside the legislative and executive branches. 
As Vile noted, Locke was writing shortly after the experience of the English Civil 
War and the English Interregnum. His feelings on the subject went a great deal further 
then others but his writing was "redolent of the experiences and writings of the periods 
in 1640."60 Locke, like most of his contemporaries, saw legislative powers supreme 
and even absolute, abounded only by certain limitations. If Locke's theory of 
government embodied the essential elements of a doctrine of the separation of powers, 
it was not a pure doctrine. In this sense, the Enlightenment and its doctrine of freedom 
of individuals over the power of any individual by birthright profoundly influenced all 
theorists of that era.61 
55. Id (emphasis in original). One author notes that the "bedrock principle of the Constitution is 
republicanism," which lodges power in officeholders (elected officials). MARTHA DERTHICK, AGENCY 
UNDER STRESS 8 (1990). 
56. VILE, supra note 5 I, at 22. 
57. Id. at 24. 
58. Id. at 3 I. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 32. 
61. Id. But see ERIC HOFFER, THE TRUE BELIEVER 140-41 ( 1951 ). Hoffer wrote: 
However, the freedom the masses crave is not freedom of self-expression and self-
realization, but freedom from the intolerable burden of an autonomous existence. They want 
freedom from "the fearful burden of free choice," freedom from the arduous responsibility 
of realizing their ineffectual selves and shouldering the blame for the blemished product. 
They do not want freedom of conscience, but faith-blind, authoritarian faith. They sweep 
away the old order not to create a society of free and independent men, but to establish 
uniformity, individual anonymity and a new structure of perfect unity. It is not the 
wickedness of the old regime they rise against but its weakness; not its oppression, but its 
failure to hammer them together into one solid, mighty whole. 
Id. at 140-41. 
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The most famous philosopher generally associated with the doctrine of separation 
of powers and the role of the judiciary is Montesquieu. While Montesquieu was 
dependent upon many contemporary English writers, including Locke, he contributed 
new ideas to the doctrine by emphasizing certain elements that did not previously 
receive much attention, particularly in relation to the judiciary. The influence of 
Montesquieu "cannot be ascribed to his originality," as it relates to the judiciary as a 
brand of government, "but rather to the manner and timing of the doctrine's 
development in his hands.',62 Montesquieu's scientific attachment to his theory is what 
gave his work particular power. Ideas that "had blossomed in English Civil War, but 
which had been premature and unrealistic in terms of the then existing society, can now 
find fertile ground in the British colonies of North America and in France.',63 
Montesquieu started with a "rather gloomy view of human nature, in which he saw 
man as exhibiting a general tendency toward evil, a tendency that manifested itself in 
selfishness, pride, envy, and the seeking out of power.''64 As he wrote, "people like 
this, being always infirment, are more easily conducted by their passions than by 
reason, which never produced any great effect in the mind of man. "65 In that sense, 
scholars would argue that liberty and freedom, as intellectually derived or traumatically 
spawned by the French and American Revolutions, constituted the source of the 
political and constitutional evolution that coincided with the Industrial Revolution. 66 
Indeed, the friction created by intellectual and physical battles over religion and 
secular authority, science and faith, rationality and revolution, have their own role in 
Enlightenment thought and the radical upheavals of the French, American, and even 
Russian Revolutions. 67 James Q. Wilson asserts: 
The Enlightenment meant many things--an enthusiasm for science, a desire to master 
nature, a beliefin progress, a commitment to reform-but at its root was, as Kant put 
it, "man's release from his self-imposed tutelage." By tutelage he meant having one's 
understanding directed by another; by self-imposed he meant a lack of courage to 
assert and rely on one's own reason. Tutelage came from unthinking or cowardly 
62. VILE, supra note SI, at 40. 
63. Id. at 41. The French Revolution profoundly effected perception of political institutions in the 
Western World and resonated for several centuries. See generally YVES-MARIE BERCE, THE BIRTH OF 
ABSOLUTISM: A HISTORY OF FRANCE 1598-1661 ()992) (for a brief discussion on the roots of the French 
Revolution); NORMAN MELCHERT, THE GREAT CONVERSATION: A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO 
PHILOSOPHY chs. 16-19 (1995); HERBERT J. MULLER, THE CHILDREN OF FRANKENSTEIN: A PRIMER ON 
MODERN TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN VALUES 30-42 (1970). 
64. VILE, supra note SI, at 41. 
65. Id (citation omitted). 
66. The notion that the Enlightenment was an elitist, effete development that has outlived its usefulness 
has it proponents. See DANIEL AzARE, THE FROZEN REPUBLIC: How THE CONSTITUTION Is p ARAL YZING 
DEMOCRACY 4-5 ( 1996) ("Latter-day Americans have got to take up arms as well against the eighteenth-
century philosophers who wrote the Federalist Papers and created the Constitution and have been 
posthumously lording it over the United Sates ever since."). 
67. See STANLEY ARONOWITZ, SCIENCE AS POWER: DISCOURSE AND IDEOLOGY IN MODERN SOCIETY 
254 (1988) ("Indeed, the two great revolutions of the bourgeois epoch, the French and the Russian, 
expressed the confidence of reason in its capacity for truth. And science, the systematic form of reason that 
combined observation, experiment, and rational calculation, became the key to human emancipation from 
ignorance and the pestilence and disorder that accompanied it."). 
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obedience to authority-the authority of revealed religion, ancient custom, received 
wisdom, or hereditary monarchs. 68 
Wilson then aptly concludes: 
I am less interested in these differences than in what its spokesmen had in common, 
and this was, as the historian Henry May has suggested, a belief that man could be 
understood by the use of our natural faculties and without relying on ancient custom 
or revealed religion. The generally shared corollaries of that belief were a commit-
ment to skeptical reason, personal freedom, and self-expression. Elsewhere, com-
munalism, tradition, and self-control remained the dominant ethos.69 
Because the study of history is sadly neglected in much of the United States today, 
let alone the study of the philosophy of government and the development of political 
theory, a public debate grounded in the deep study ofhuman thought and epistemology 
as a function of this spawning dialectic is incredibly difficult. 70 The touchstone is not, 
however, merely the nature of a social contract as it evolved after the Enlightenment, 
or its relationship to the judiciary and separation of powers. The legitimacy of the 
judiciary is a function of its moral capacity to encourage and enforce an "overriding 
value on public order" or, under compression, the "moral obligation to obey law, an 
obligation based on considerations of mutual advantage and the social contract, [that] 
dwindles to a weak, easily defeasible obligation to obey laws that are not morally 
offensive. "71 
B. The Roots of the Social Contract 
Family, friends, political careers, moral and ethical values, religion, life or death 
experiences are all part of the judicial system today. Modern courts are the repository 
of modern political debate and policy rationales, which would have mortified (but 
perhaps not surprised over candid conversation at the local inn) the American 
philosopher who thought that the judiciary "has no influence over either the sword or 
the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can 
take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither force nor will, 
but merely judgment. ... "72 
Enlightenment philosophers would have easily recognized contemporary 
discussions concerning the tension between freedom of the soul (preferably God or 
68. JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE 196 (1993) (citation omitted). 
69. Id. at 196-97 (citation omitted). As this article is written (and re-written), the human propensity 
for cycles that reflect the tension between "secularism's lost elan" and faith are ever-present. Wilfred M. 
McClay, Will Religion Still Seem an Illusion?, WILSON Q., Winter 2006, at 38, 38. 
70. Indeed, anyone writing for publication today bears the potential consequences if the expression of 
opinion and ambition collide at a point in the future. A philosophy of history and its study should not 
ignore the complexity of that effort as historians may "approach the past each with [their] own 
philosophical ideas, and ... this has a decisive effect on the way they interpret it." W.H. WALSH, 
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 105 (Harper & Bros. 1960) (1951); see also JOHN TOSH, THE PuRsurr OF 
HISTORY: AIMS, METHODS AND NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF MODERN HISTORY (1984). 
71. POSNER, supra note 10, at 234-35. 
72. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 496 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed., Random House, Inc. 
2000). 
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nature) and who is going to govern that soul (government by consent or government 
by inheritance). The "central feature of the Enlightenment was the emphasis that all 
kinds of scholars began to place upon the study of human nature. "73 lfone accepts the 
notion that a purpose of Enlightenment was to fathom the mystery of God, and the 
boundaries upon which God would impose rule upon his people in a Utopia, as Saint 
Thomas More would suggest, then such purpose could only be achieved ''with the 
proper study of mankind as man. "74 This "new" approach of the Enlightenment 
objected to biblical explanation because the nature of man could be understood by 
observation, experiment, or empiricism rather than mere faith alone. 
In the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes argued in Leviathan that men are 
"naturally and fundamentally self-seeking, individually existing units, who have to 
learn to co-operate within a society." 75 From this conclusion Hobbes proffers 
separation of powers as a necessary construct for a government that reflects the true 
"nature of man": 
From this equality of ability [ among men], ariseth the equality ofhope in the attaining 
of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which neverthelesse 
they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in a way to their End, (which is 
principally their owne conservation, and sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour 
to destroy, or subdue one an other. And from hence it comes to passe, that where an 
Invader hath no more to feare, then an other mans single power; if one plant, sow, 
build, or possesse a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come 
prepared with forces united, to dispossesse, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of 
his labour, but also of his life, or liberty. And the Invader again is in the like danger 
of another. 76 
Thus, "in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrell. First, 
Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory. The first, maketh men invade for 
Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third, for Reputation." 77 Political power, and the 
exercise of that power, for Hobbes, meant that 
this (war] of every mart against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can 
be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place. 
Where there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no Injustice. 
Force, and Fraud, are in [war] the two Cardinali vertues. Justice, and Injustice are 
none of the Faculties of either the Body nor Mind. If they were, they might be in a 
man that were alone in the world, as well as his Senses, and Passions. They are 
Qualities, that relate to men in Society, not in Solitude. It is consequent also to the 
same condition, that there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct; 
but onely that to be every mans, that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. 
And thus much for the ill conditioned, which man by meer Nature is actually placed 
in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consistenting partly in the Passions, 
partly in his Reason.78 
73. THE ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 52, at 3. 
74. Id. at 4. 
75. Id. 
76. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 87 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651). 
77. Id. at 88. 
78. Id. at 90. 
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If the most trenchant nature of man is to do harm to another and to grasp at power 
to obtain the best bargain in the marketplace of government or consumptive advantage, 
as Adam Smith eventually suggested, secular or religious human motives can only be 
blunted by avoiding the utopian quest for a merger of powers in any one person or 
entity. 79 If power is contingent, when divided between governmental branches and the 
function and authority of those branches, no individual person or adversary may trump 
the other. 80 
The Enlightenment brought about two revolutions that impacted thoughts about 
government structure and human nature: science and freedom as the intellectual and 
efficient causes of a political legacy. Indeed, the history of science and its blending 
with historiography as it arises from the Enlightenment, established ''three classes of 
problems-the determination of significant fact, matching of facts with theory, and 
articulation of theory." 81 The science of separation of powers is the science of 
mankind's observation of humanity as systemic and sub-systemic patterns acting, 
evolving, and adapting upon and through each other. 82 The Enlightenment, therefore, 
was a new means of conducting inquiry, and the social contract is evidence of the 
tangible existence of a governmental construct under which humanity can live with 
relative civility (in theory). 
The social contract of seventeenth and eighteenth century was, as Hobbes 
understood, "man's release from self-incurred tutelage. "83 Shapiro asserts that Hobbes' 
Leviathan and John Locke's Second Treatise on Government, which first appeared 
anonymously in England in the 1680s, evolved the social contract theory: the state's 
legitimacy is rooted in agreement. In that sense the Enlightenment was the 
"philosophical movement aimed at rationalizing social life by basing it on scientific 
principles and in which there is a powerful normative impetus to take seriously the 
ideal of human freedom as expressed in political doctrine of individual rights." 84 
79. See LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 200-01 (I 971 ){'The right social order does not 
normally come about by natural necessity on account of man's ignorance of that order. The 'invisible hand' 
remains ineffectual if it is not supported by the Leviathan or, if you wish, by the Wealth of Nations."); see 
also RADIN, supra note 10; GoRDON TULLOCK, ARTHUR SELDON & GoRDON L. BRADY, GoVERNMENT 
FAILURE: A PRIMER IN PUBLIC CHOICE 4 (2002). 
80. "Aspice, num mage sit nostrum penetrabile telum." [Look whether my weapon is not far from 
wounding.] Gottfried W. Leibniz, Essays on Theodicy, in THE ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 52, at 69, 69 
(quoting VIRGIL, AENEID, 10. 481). 
81. THOMAS . KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 34 (3d ed. 1996). 
82. See DANIEL NYBERG, POWER OVER POWER 42 (1981) (arguing that "the two oldest human traits 
are based of our tendency to organize in response to the threat of chaos"). 
83. THE ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 52, at 54. 
84. SHAPIRO, supra note 52, at 3. There are critics of glorifying Enlightenment thinkers while ignoring 
the economic advantages sought by its proponents. See HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 73 (2003) (''The philosophy of the Declaration, that government is set up by the people to 
secure their life, liberty, and happiness, and is to be overthrown when it no longer does that, is often traced 
to the ideas of John Locke, in his Second Treatise on Government. That was published in England in 1689, 
when the English were rebelling against tyrannical kings and setting up parliamentary government. The 
Declaration, like Locke's Second Treatise, talked about government and political rights, but ignored the 
existing inequalities in property. And how could people truly have equal rights, with stark differences in 
wealth? Locke himself was a wealthy man, with investments in the silk trade and slave trade, income from 
loans and mortgages."); NORMAN F. CANTOR, IMAGINING THE LA w: COMMON LA w AND THE FOUNDATION 
OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM IO ( 1997) ('The mind-set of the common law is the same as the one that 
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Critics may rationalize human nature and science as utilitarian, Marxist, or within 
social contract traditions, with all sorts of elegant and inelegant solutions to the pull 
of groups to co-opt government for personal gain. Others would argue that the 
democratic tradition has ancient origins but modern formations of social contract 
theory arise because democrats, in the mold of Rousseau, hold that "governments are 
legitimate when those who are affected by decisions play an appropriate role in making 
them and when there are meaningful opportunities to oppose the government of the 
day, replacing it with an altemative." 85 
The search for a scientific or historical truth in the social contract may evolve from 
"faith in the power of human reason to understand the true nature of our circumstances 
and ourselves. The Enlightenment outlook is optimistic to its core, supplying impetus 
to the idea of progress in human affairs."86 But human reason cannot ignore the role 
of"government" as a unity in light of the cold reality of human nature, and the need 
for law boundedness and some form of constitutionalism if freedom is to thrive. This 
profound knot raises the serious question of what happens when a society's complexity 
and interests are so diverse that coalitions with sufficient representative power cannot 
form so as to foster government by a legitimate proxy of the polis. Does such a knot 
then geometrically increase the power of interest groups and bureaucratic elites to a 
level equal to or greater than the historic relationship between the polis and its 
representatives? Since nature abhors a vacuum and political institutions fill any power 
vacuum, a plausible outcome is that the function of delivering justice is "hived off to 
specialists." 87 The polis then accepts the judiciary as that specialist; possessing a 
unique constitutional primitur (lawfulness) and superior decision-making skills 
(insight). 
The traditional focus of political theory, from Locke onward, has been the 
legislative branch (the people's representatives by dispersion) or the executive (the 
people's representatives by visibility and cohesion). 88 Conversely, the practical focus 
of modern "Anglo-American legal theory has been on the individuals who resolve 
disputes over the application of legal norms and who often in the course of doing so 
modify, refine, or elaborate those norms-the judges." 89 The complexity of this 
modern development is built upon notions of''judicial independence," "professional 
norms," and "hieratic stagecraft of judging-the raised bench, the robes, the oaths, the 
jargon and rhetoric[.]" 90 
was operative in market capitalism, and the institutions of the common law were instrumental in the rise 
of capitalism from the fourteenth century onward. Their connection served the interests not ofa single 
selfish class but of society as a whole. That is the historical vision of Law and Economics. It is closely 
affiliated with the Reaganite and Thatcherism politics of the 1980s and similar conservative political 
affirmations since then."). 
85. SHAPIRO, supra note 52, at 5. Rousseau, however, also believed that the social contract had a 
serrated edge because "whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole 
body. This means nothing less than that he will beforced to be free .... " JAMES BOVARD, FREEDOM IN 
CHAINS: THE RISE OF THE STATE AND THE DEMISE OF THE CITIZEN 53 (1999). 
86. SHAPIRO, supra note 52, at 7. 
87. POSNER, supra note 10, at S. 
88. Id at 6. 
89. Id. 
90. ld.at6-1. 
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In the case study of AMHI, the Consent Decree bargained for the ideals of a 
single judge exempt from the usual political constraints to enforce a concurrent bargain 
of social justice for the disabled as served by the other branches of government. What 
was not foreseen was the dynamic differences between appellate courts, which serve 
a different role in the hierarchy of justice in state government-political and 
constitutional-and the individual judge confronting, as did Justice Mills, the express 
terms of the parties' bargain and the consequences of avoidant behavior. 91 This 
admixture of public policy, interest groups, and judicial behaviors is an ongoing source 
of much study and debate. 92 The use of litigation, however, to deliver social justice, 
91. The role of judges in a democracy has been the source of much study and analysis--from the inside 
and outside. See JUSTICE BERNARD BOTEIN, TRIAL JUDGE 13 7 ( 1952) ('The early judges probably had the 
same aspirations and the same bedevilments as do the judges of today. They sought to impart uniformity, 
certainty, and predictability to the law; and they tried to do so by following the decisions in cases previously 
decided by themselves, their contemporaries, and their predecessor judges. In so doing, they bound 
themselves to the wheel of the very precedents they established. The law became rigid and unyielding, and 
proved incapable of coping with the demands of a developing and more complex social order."); JUDGE 
ROBERT SATTER, DolNG JUSTICE: A TRIAL JUDGE AT WORK 64 (1990) ("Experience has taught me that 
in some kinds of cases the positivists are right; in others the realists are right; and in still others it very much 
depends upon the judge."). 
92. See WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 9-10 (1964) ("Tactics will refer to 
maneuverings designed to obtain advantages in dealing with colleagues, lower court judges, other 
governmental officials, interest groups, or the public at large. Strategies will refer to the over-all plans 
under which such maneuverings against specific obstacles are co-ordinated and for which scarce resources 
are allocated in order to further the accomplishment of the broad policy objective. Second, the kind of 
reasoning used here is far more difficult to apply to Supreme Court Justices than to most other highly placed 
government or party officials or to businessmen. If a firm does not act rationally and does not allocate its 
resources in the most efficient way, it is usually 'punished' by a loss or profits if not by financial ruin. 
Similarly, elected officials who wish to stay in office must organize their behavior according to national 
standards; if not they are likely to be defeated at the polls or at least will face expensive and harrowing 
campaigns for re-election. With an assured salary and life tenure, a Justice, assuming he does not have to 
worry about impeachment, need not fear loss of money or position if he does not act rationally in terms of 
his policy aims.") (emphasis in original). See also CARL T. ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS: 
THE WORLD OF THURGOOD MARSHALL (1993) (for a compelling story of the blending of policy, practice 
and consequences). Almost 300 years ago, a writer of public policy stated: 
It is true that sometimes a lawyer diplomat has made a great success of negotiation, 
especially in countries where the final responsibility for public policy lay with public 
assemblies which could be moved by adroit speech, but in general the training of a lawyer 
breeds habits and dispositions of mind which are not favorable to the practice of diplomacy. 
And though it be true that success in the law-courts depends largely upon a knowledge of 
human nature and an ability to exploit it-both of which are factors in diplomacy-it is 
none the less true that the occupation of the lawyer, which is to split hairs about nothing, is 
not a good preparation for the treatment of grave public affairs in the region of diplomacy. 
If this be true of the advocate or barrister, it is still more true of the magistrate and judge. 
The habit of mind engendered by presiding over a court oflaw, in which the judge himself 
is supreme, tends to exclude those faculties of suppleness and adaptability which are 
necessary in diplomacy, and the almost ludicrous assumption of dignity by a judge would 
certainly appear as arrogance in diplomatic circles. I do not say that there have not been 
great lawyers and great judges who were endowed with high diplomatic qualities, but again 
I place these considerations before my readers in the belief that the more closely they are 
observed the more surely will they lead to efficiency in the diplomatic profession. 
MONSIEURDECALLIERDS,0NTHEMANNEROFNEGOTIATINGWITHPR.INCES40-41 (16)(A.F. White trans., 
Houghton Mifflin 2000) ( 17 I 6). 
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and its influence on the social contract as a function of constitutional evolution, is a 
matter of immediate concern. 
C. Social Justice Litigation as the Modem American Social Contract 
As some historians assert, notions of liberal democracy as evolved in the United 
States made, 
no less than six governmental inventions, all of which have been taken up world-
wide: the deliberate formulation of a new frame of government by way of a popular 
Convention, the written Constitution, Bill of Rights within this Constitution, the 
latter's status as paramount law guaranteed by judicial review, the "separation of 
powers" along functional lines, and the division of powers between national and state 
governments now denoted by the term "federalism. "93 
Separation of powers as a concept of checks and balances was not an American 
invention but "a doctrine that goes right back to Polybius, the historian of the Roman 
Republic." 94 The American "invention" substituted these 
sociological categories, organs or branches of government-the familiar executive 
and bicameral legislature-distinguished from one another by virtue ofthejimctions 
they performed. The chief executive commanded the armed forces, made peace or 
war, and carried on the administration: these were the "functions"-and the inherent 
nature of the executive power. The bicameral legislature made laws-the legislative 
of function. And the judiciary "adjudged" between rival claimants.95 
While this form of functionalism has received much discussion in the context of 
overarching constitutional theory and practice, the fabric of separation of powers and 
its impact on individual freedom remains a source of tension: "Each of us puts his 
person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, 
and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the 
whole. "96 In this sense of the social contract and the general will, the separate branches 
of government could not be "rival claimants" acting in opposition to each other so as 
to be "adjudged." Only in the most modern sense has the status of those without a 
voice in either branch of government meant recognizing that voice by the judicial 
imposition of a receiver, for example, to obtain an outcome that the other branches of 
government, cannot or will not, convey. 
And it is this radical departure from the original doctrine of separation of powers 
that provides the subtext for the discussion in Part IV. Montesquieu implied in his 
work that each branch of government performed its own particular function. 97 As to 
which function is being performed by which branch, it is doubtful that anyone within 
93. FINER, supra note 51, at 1485. 
94. Id. at 1507. 
95. Id. 
96. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE GENERAL WILL IN SOCIAL CONTRACT 
THEORY: READINGS IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY I 08, 112 (Michel LessnofT ed., 1990); see also 
]ACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 250 
(1996) ("Americans paid homage to Montesquieu's principle of separation without allowing his (or 
Locke's) defense of prerogative to outweigh the lessons of their own history."). 
97. VILE, supra note 51, at 46. 
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the Enlightenment thought that the judiciary could impose any type of equitable 
remedy upon the other branches of government so as to engage the treasury and force 
an expenditure of funds. 
Indeed, in Federalist No. 48, Madison argued that most state constitutions, 
Virginia's in particular, laid down separation of powers to preclude the overlapping of 
functions by one branch with that of the others. 98 In Federalist No. 51, Madison wrote: 
[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same 
department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary 
constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others .... 
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be 
connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human 
nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. 
But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?99 
This viewpoint is consistent with Montesquieu's "rather gloomy view ofhuman nature, 
in which he saw man as exhibiting a general tendency toward evil, a tendency that 
manifests itself in selfishness, pride, envy, and the seeking of power. Man, though a 
reasoning animal, is led by his desires into immoderate acts." 100 Montesquieu wrote: 
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the 
same body of magistracy, there can be then no liberty .... Again, there is no liberty, 
if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers. 
Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed 
to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the 
executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor. 
Miserable indeed would be the case, were the same man, or the same body whether 
of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, 
that of executing the public resolutions, and that of judging the crimes or differences 
of individuals. 101 
Indeed, there is an intriguing question as to whether expressions ofnatural law, which 
pre-date the Enlightenment by almost two thousand years, are reflected today in the 
belief that social justice is best delivered by vesting authority in one person because 
knowledge ofnatural law is understood to protect individual rights. The modem social 
contract, therefore, may recognize that enforcement and security of rights requires 
some human dispenser and decision-maker. For example, it was Antigone's sensitivity 
to natural law that justified her decision to defy Creon, who forbade the burial of her 
dead brother: 
98. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 318 (James Madison) (Robert Scigliano ed., Random House, Inc. 
2000). 
99. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 331 (James Madison or Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed., 
Random House, Inc. 2000). 
100. VILE, supra note 51, at 41. 
IO I. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LA ws 202 (David w. Carrithers ed. & trans., Univ. of California 
Press 1977) (1748). Fear of an imperial judiciary colored the debates concerning the American 
Constitution. See MARVIN 0LASKY, FIGHTING FOR LIBERTY AND VIRTUE: POLmCAL AND CULTURAL WARS 
IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 224-26 (1995); KAREN GREEN, THE WOMAN OF REASON: FEMINISM, 
HUMANISM AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 44 (1995) (discussing Hobbes's "attempt to reduce moral truths to 
truths of reason, and to argue that morality is identical with rational self-interest"). 
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That order did not come from God. Justice, 
That dwells with the gods below, knows no such law. 
I did not think your edicts strong enough 
To overrule the unwritten unalterable laws 
Of God and heaven, you being only a man. 
They are not of yesterday or today, but everlasting, 
Though where they come from none of us can tell. 102 
93 
If this is true then the judiciary's role may begin with what Locke asserted was "a duty 
not to harm other people in their 'life, health, liberty or possessions. "' 103 
Such a modem social contract theory adapts a branch of political philosophy that 
grounds the legitimacy of political authority, as well as the obligations of rulers and 
subjects (and the limits thereof), to matters of public and private choice. In more 
modem terms, critiques ofHumean, Hegelian and Marxist contract theory have been 
revived by John Rawls to emphasize the feature of contractarianism that emphasizes 
its superiority over utilitarianism, with its "exclusive attention to aggregate, as distinct 
from individual, benefit." 104 Rawls' attempt to cope with the ''veil of ignorance" and 
his hypothetical contract has been intensely controversial. For Robert Nozick, for 
example, the social contract is just as much of a trick as ''the historical 'original 
contract' ... , not, however, a trick played by the rich on the poor, but almost the other 
way round. More precisely, Nozick charges that it enables the 'poorly endowed' to 
exploit the 'well endowed. "' 105 
Thus, here we are today with a public that may accept a social contract that 
aggregates power and policymaking in a judicial theocracy of one ( or a panel of ones). 
The constitutional equilibrium that James Madison spoke of "is like that ofa planetary 
system, in which the bodies hold to their own spheres despite the fact that they are not 
of equal size." 106 Madison's favorite terms "for the relations of the three departments 
in The Federalist as well as in his correspondence, are the organization of its function 
and the distribution of its powers." 107 It was a "high Enlightenment ideal to apply the 
mind to social arrangements that had been taken for granted as simple givens." 108 For 
that purpose, there is a "hierarchy of function. " 109 The hierarchy within the Constitution 
is legible on its face, considering that the length of Article I is twice the length of 
Article II, and Article II is twice the length of Article III. 110 
102. NICHOLAS JOLLEY, LocKE: His PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT 197 (1999) (quoting Sophocles, 
Antigone, in THE THEBAN PLAYS 126, 138 (E.F. Watling trans., 1947)). 
103. Id. at 202 (quoting JOHN LoCKE, Two TREATISES OF GoVERNMENT 271 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690)). 
I 04. Id. at 17. Marx had a different view of the evolution of men and history: "He continued to think 
that history must work out well even though there was admittedly no deus ex machina to ensure this result." 
G.D.H. COLE, THE MEANING OF MARXISM 32 (1948). 
105. Lessnoff, supra note 96, at 19 (quoting ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 192-98 
(1974)). 
106. GARRY WILLS, A NECESSARY EVIL: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT 84 
(1999). 
107. Id. at 84-85. 
108. Id. at 85. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 86. 
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Modem notions of power and the social contract embed litigation as a solution to 
social conflict. as judges must "look forward to redress wrongs that would otherwise 
occur in the future." 111 When the judiciary began to engage in what could properly be 
described as versions of corrective or distributive justice, such as determining how the 
burden of taxes should be apportioned or determining fairly how our scarce public 
resources should be allocated by weighing competing interests, a dispute arose that has 
existed since Aristotle's time. As Aristotle noted, ''the cause of strife and complaints 
is usually that people who are equal are given unequal shares or that the people who 
are not equal are given equal shares." 112 · 
Thus, some would argue that a compelling new principle of social justice is 
commonly accepted today, in which redress may be sought through the judiciary. 113 
Modem litigation advances causes through ''the effort by interest groups, and the 
lawyers who serve them to persuade the judiciary to take direction of the wealth or the 
strength of the society, that is, to formulate policy and to dispense distributive or 
political justice. The effort usually arises out of an interest group's frustration at its 
inability to secure the relief it seeks from those branches of government charged with 
the responsibility for weighing its interests against competing interests." 114 As author 
Daniel Nyberg noted, 
[This] theory of freedom has a dreary past and has produced a modem disaster. The 
dreariness comes from the persistent regularity with which so many have asked the 
wrong questions about freedom based on the mistaken presumption that freedom is 
the sort of thing that people possess or do not possess simpliciter. The disaster is that 
we have become so enthralled by Freedom as a magnificent singular abstraction that 
we defeat the humane possibilities of daily community life. 115 
What then of social contract through litigation, with the judiciary as purveyor of equity 
justice and propagator and definer of individual freedom? 
IV. THE RECEIVER, SEPARATION OF POWERS, AND THE MAINE CONSTITUTION 
The appointment of a receiver in Bates, unlike Olmstead, did not occur in the 
vacuum of a hypothetical social contract, but rather according to the terms of an actual 
contract. The parties to the 1990 Consent Decree voluntarily sought and accepted the 
court's supervision to remedy the serious problems that led to the 1989 lawsuit. 
Indeed, paragraph I(F)(l2) of the settlement agreement provided that: 
Until the Agreement's termination pursuant to the terms of the Consent Decree, the 
parties hereby consent to the court's continuing supervision of this matter, until 
further order of the Court, and to its authority to interpret the provisions of this 
Agreement, to review and adopt plans necessary to implementation of its terms, to 
modify its terms as may be needed to effect its purposes, and to take appropriate 
111. ARYEH NEIER, ONLY JUDGMENT:THELIMITSOF LITIGATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE 16 (1982). 
112. Id. (citing ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book V, ch. 7). 
113. NEIER, supra note 111, at 17. 
114. Id at 19. 
115. NYBERG, supra note 82, at 120. 
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actions within its equitable powers to ensure its enforcement and the fulfillment of its 
terms and purposes. 116 
95 
The Superior Court accepted "that responsibility," and recognized that ''thirteen years 
later, the court remains obligated to take appropriate action to enforce the Consent 
Decree." 117 As the court noted, based on the "history of this case since 1990 and the 
evidence presented at trial, it is clear that the defendants, if left on their own, will not 
achieve substantial compliance in the near future. " 118 Chief Justice Mills was "mindful 
that 'the substitution of a court's authority for that of elected and appointed officials 
is an extraordinary step warranted only by the most compelling circumstances. "' 119 
Nevertheless, the court found 
[s]uch circumstances are present in this case. After twelve years and extraordinary 
expenditures of state funds, the defendants have failed to comply with the important 
provisions of the Consent Decree. For thirteen years, the court has given due 
deference to the defendants' efforts to comply with their obligations. . . . This 
deference has gone unrewarded: 20 
Chief Justice Mills concluded that her findings and conclusions in the Part I Order 
provided "a factual basis for appointment of a receiver." 121 "To the extent that 
receivership is a 'remedy of last resort,' the court [ did] not hesitate to impose it 
here." 122 The "history of this case, the evidence presented during the seven-week trial, 
the defendants' lack of accountability, and their failure to recognize reality compel the 
conclusion that they may never achieve substantial compliance on their own 
initiative." 123 On this basis, the court ordered that 
[t]he powers and authority of the receiver shall be those that in usual circumstances 
are vested in the Superintendent of AMHI as they relate to the Superintendent's duties 
and obligations under the Consent Decree. The receiver will have the responsibility 
and authority to comply with all provisions of the Consent Decree and Settlement 
Agreement. 124 
116. Bates v. Duby, No. Civ. A. 89-088, slip op. at 1-2 (Me. Super. Ct. Sept. 10, 2003), available at 
http://www.courts.state.me.us/opinions/superior/2003%200pinions/AMH1Partll0p.pdf(last visited Oct. 
8, 2006). 
111. Id. at 2. 
118. Id. See Feliciano v. Gonzalez. 13 F. Supp. 2d ISi, 1S4 (D.P.R. 1998) (court-appointed expert 
concluding that "there was virtually no likelihood that defendants, left to their own devices, would ever 
achieve compliance with the court's orders"). 
119. Bates v. Duby, No. Civ. A. 89-088, slip op. at 2-3 (Me. Super. Ct. Sept. 10, 2003), available at 
http://www.courts.state.me.us/opinions/superior/2003%200pinions/AMH1Partll0p.pdf(last visited Oct. 
8, 2006) (quoting Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d S21, S3S (1st Cir. 1976)). 
120. Id. at 3 (citing Shaw v. Allen, 771 F. Supp. 760, 763 (S.D.W. Va. 1990)). 
121. Id.at3. 
122. Id. (quoting Dixon v. Barry, 967 F. Supp. S3S, 5S4 (D.D.C. 1997)). 
123. Id. (citing Dixon, 967 F. Supp. at SS0; Morgan, S40 F.2d at S29; Newman v. Alabama, 466 F. 
Supp. 628, 630, 63S (M.D.Ala. 1979)). 
124. Id at S, para. 2. The court gave the receiver powers, authority, and duties including but not limited 
to the following: 
A. To oversee, supervise, and direct all financial, contractual, legal, administrative, and 
personnel functions at AMHI that relate to the Consent Decree and to restructure 
AMHI into an organization that will achieve compliance; 
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Chief Justice Mills did not, however, find a constitutional violation as the basis for her 
Order, but instead relied upon the State's lengthy history ofnon-compliance as a matter 
of contract. On appeal, the Law Court declined to address the State's separation of 
powers argument because the lower "court employed an incorrect legal standard to 
evaluate substantial compliance." 125 Even though politically unpalatable, the Law 
Court could have found the appointment of a receiver a constitutionally acceptable 
outcome within thefanctional duty of the court's authority under the Consent Decree 
and applicable provisions of the Maine Constitution. 
A. The Constitutional Background 
When Maine adopted its Constitution in 1820, the separation of powers between 
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches was mandated by Article III, Sections 
B. To contract with public and private agencies, to appoint personnel, and to do whatever 
is lawful and required for the administration of AMHI; 
C. To formulate and implement plans necessary to provide acceptable levels of staff, 
service, and safety for patients at AMHI in compliance with the Consent Decree; 
D. To have unlimited access to records and files maintained by AMHI as reasonably 
necessary to achieve compliance with the Consent Decree; 
E. To have unlimited access to all facilities, buildings, and premises under the control of 
AMHI as reasonably necessary to achieve compliance with the Consent Decree; 
F. To retain consultants, experts, or other persons to provide training to the AMHI staff 
or to assist in any other manner necessary to carry out the duties as receiver and to 
achieve compliance with the Consent Decree; 
G. To conduct confidential interviews with all AMHI employees and staff; such persons 
shall cooperate with the receiver and respond to all inquiries and requests related to 
compliance with the Consent Decree; 
H. To conduct confidential interviews with patients at AMHI; 
I. To establish personal policies; to create, abolish, or transfer positions; to hire, 
terminate, promote, transfer, and evaluate staff; and to set staff compensation; 
J. To negotiate new contracts and renegotiate existing contracts, including contracts with 
labor unions; 
K. To restructure the management and administrative organization of AMHI as necessary 
or appropriate to achieve compliance with the Consent Decree; 
L. To acquire, dispose of, modernize, repair, and lease property; 
M. To establish the budget of AMHI as necessary to comply with the Consent Decree and 
to work with the Legislature in securing approval for the budget; 
N. To recommend to the court any appropriate modifications of the Consent Decree; 
0. To petition the court for any additional powers and orders that are necessary to 
perform the duties as receiver; 
P. To cooperate with the court, Master, and attorneys for the parties and report to the 
court on a monthly basis; 
Q. To prepare a work plan for submission to the court, Master, and attorneys for the 
parties within two months of the date of appointment. The plan will (I) review and 
document accurately the current conditions at AMHI as they relate to the Consent 
Decree, (2) describe specific objectives and tasks that will be undertaken to address 
each concern relating to AMHI outlined in the Part I Order and to achieve compliance, 
and (3) outline specifically the time frame, not to exceed nine months from the date 
of appointment within which those tasks will be accomplished. Id at 5-7 paras. A-Q. 
125. Bates v. Dep't of Behavioral & Developmental Servs., 2004 ME 154, 'I! 86,863 A.2d 890 at 912. 
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I and 2. 126 When interpreting Article III of the Maine Constitution, the Law Court has 
historically maintained that the "separation of governmental powers mandated by the 
Maine Constitution is much more rigorous than the same principle as applied to the 
federal government." 127 Thus, "any exercise of judicial authority over the Executive 
or Legislative Branches of State Government must be undertaken respecting these 
constraints." 128 
Since its adoption in 1820, the Maine Constitution has remained essentially the 
same, both functionally and structurally. As author Marshall Tinkle has observed, 
what is important for our current purposes is that "Maine's constitutional development 
has been conservative in the Burkean sense: reforming to preserve, adapting old 
institutions to meet current exigencies, but eschewing the kind ofinnovation that would 
obliterate the past. It has been chiefly marked by continuity and stability-traits that, 
however desirable, make for dull history." 129 Tinkle also points out, the structure and 
language of the Maine Constitution belie the assumption that it shadowed John 
Adams 's Massachusetts prototype. Instead, the Maine Constitution followed more than 
two dozen other state constitutions that appeared during the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries and avoided much of the "prolixity, rhetoric, and abstract 
declaration of principle found in the Massachusetts charter." 130 
As is well-studied, the U.S. Constitution does not actually contain a specific 
separation of powers doctrine. 131 Instead, the doctrine developed early in U.S. history 
as the result of an interplay of political and economic forces, as well as arguments that 
appeared in The Federalist at the time. From the intellectual to the practical, this 
debate encouraged the extrapolation of the "functional" aspects offederalism or, more 
descriptively, constitutionalism. 132 
126. Maine was admitted as a state in the Missouri compromise of I 820 whereby Missouri was admitted 
as a slave state and Maine (as detached from Massachusetts) a free state. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN 
ADAMS 632-33 (2001). 
127. Bates, 2004 ME 154, ,i 84,863 A.2d at 91 I (citations omitted). 
128. Id. 
129. MARSHALL]. TINKLE, THE MAINE STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE I (1992). 
130. Id. at 4. As "time would prove," John Adams had ''written one of the great enduring documents 
of the American Revolution. The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is the oldest 
functioning written constitution in the world." MCCULLOUGH, supra note 126, at 225. 
131. See JOHN P. ROCHE, THE FOUNDING FATHERS: A REFORM CAUCUS IN ACTION, in AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL ESSA vs IO (Leonard w. Levy, ed. 1966); see also Dan T. Coenen, A 
Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of lnterbranch 
Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1575 (2001). 
132. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLffiCAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL NSWERS: DoES THE RULE OF LAW 
APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS 31 (1992) ("Each branch should be free to set the limits of its powers by 
expressing its essentially unreviewable understanding of the Constitution's parameters and acting thereon 
without fear of judicial contradiction."). Roche concluded that the Constitution was not a triumph for 
abstract ideology: 
Beginning with the inspired propaganda of Hamilton, Madison and Jay, the ideological 
build-up got under way. The Federalist had little impact on the ratification of the 
Constitution, except perhaps in New York, but this volume had enormous influence on the 
image of the Constitution in the minds of future generations, particularly on historians and 
political scientists who have an innate fondness for theoretical symmetry. Yet, while the 
shades of Locke and Montesquieu may have been hovering in the background, and the 
delegates may have been unconscious instruments of a transcendent telos,. the careful 
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Article III, Section I of the Maine Constitution expressly establishes a specific 
separation of powers and Articles IV, V and VI address each separate branch of 
government and its functions. Although these Articles are suggested by the 
Massachusetts Constitution, Maine's ''was one of the first constitutions to devote a 
separate article to it." 133 Other states were evolving a similar, specific theory of 
divisible government in state constitutions. Indeed, more than two centuries ago a 
major strand of English and American thought was summarized by a Pennsylvania 
newspaper in 1784 concerning the Pennsylvania constitutional debate: 
In a government like ours, the authorities delegated by the freemen at large are 
distributed and lodged with three distinct branches; the legislative, the supreme 
executive, and the judicial: Each strongly marked and characterised. To the first 
belongs the right to make and alter the general rules of the society; that is to say the 
laws. With the second is entrusted the execution of these general rules, by itself, and 
the subordinate officers of the state, chiefly nominated by this body. And to the third, 
which is properly but a subdivision of the second, is committed the interpretation and 
application of the laws to controverted cases, in standing tribunals, circumscribed by 
solemn and settled rules of proceeding .... From this severance of power, essential 
to free and equal government, we infer, that each of these branches, of right, exercises 
all authority, devolved by the community, which properly belongs to it, unless the 
contrary be clearly expressed. And if, in any case, the constitution has assigned 
jurisdiction to one of these branches, which is not naturally within its resort, the 
power so misplaced should be construed strictly, and carried no further than barely 
to satisfy the words, and at the same time accord with common sense. 134 
The relationship between the "jurisdiction" of each branch of government and the 
authority of courts to impose equitable relief to require specific functions by another 
branch has been debated in the context of judicial decisions ranging from 
desegregation to deinstitutionalization. 135 In the most rigid sense of constitutional 
canon "the first branch enacts laws, the second approves and executes them, and the 
third expounds and enforces them." 136 From this proposition, the Law Court has held 
that each branch of government has only those powers expressly authorized by the 
Constitution plus incidental powers necessary to exercise its duties. 137 The "inherent 
right to accomplish all objects necessarily within the orbit of that particular department 
extends only so far as such power is not expressly allocated to, or limited by the 
existence of a similar power in one of the other departments." 138 This "formal test is 
observer of the day-to-day work of the Convention finds no over-arching principles. The 
"separation of powers" to him seems to be a by-product of suspicion, and "federalism" he 
views as a pis al/er, as the farthest point the delegates felt they could go in the destruction 
of state power without themselves inviting repudiation. 
ROCHE, supra note 131, at 45. 
133. TINKLE, supra note 129, at 59. 
134. VILE, supra note 51, at 70. 
135. See John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of 
the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121 (1996). 
136. TINKLE, supra note 129, at 59-60. 
13 7. See, e.g .. New England Outdoor Ctr. v. Comm 'r of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife, 2000 ME 66, 748 
A.2d 1009; State v. Hunter, 447 A.2d 797 (Me. 1982); Sawyerv. Gilmore, 109 Me. 169 (1912). 
138. TINKLE, supra note 129, at 61 (citation omitted). 
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much more rigorous than the functional approach to the separation of powers under the 
Federal Constitution, which does not apply to the distribution of power among the 
branches of state government. " 139 For example, the Maine Constitution commits the 
power to appoint and remove judges to the executive and legislative branches but the 
power to discipline judges, short of removal, adheres to the judicial branch alone. 140 
The jurisdiction of each branch, and its inherent powers, exists within the judiciary 
as a co-equal branch of government. As with the U.S. Supreme Court, the only court 
expressly mentioned in Article VI is the Maine Supreme Judicial Court: "[T]he judicial 
power of this State shall be vested in a Supreme Judicial Court, and such other courts 
as the Legislature from time to time establish. " 141 Of importance, once jurisdiction 
over certain areas has been conferred on the judiciary under Article VI, other 
departments of the government are forbidden to exercise such jurisdiction under the 
separation of powers doctrine. 142 The Law Court has long retained within the sphere 
ofits existence under Article VI the exclusive power of judicial review, which permits 
it to strike down any statute that it views as unconstitutional. 143 
The AMHI Consent Decree case is unique only in that the executive branch 
expressly granted authority, by contract incorporated into a court order, to the judicial 
branch to determine the scope of substantial compliance and to exercise its "equitable 
powers" to foster compliance with the decree. The Bates decision arguably rewrites 
the Consent Decree in light of the Olmstead decision and the Law Court's own 
definition of fairness ( or unfairness ).144 In fact, the ADA and Olmstead did not exist 
at the time of the Consent Decree and the State had made no effort to amend or modify 
the provisions of the Consent Decree, but merely sought to secure a certificate of 
substantial compliance from the Superior Court only after the court imposed deadlines. 
It is doubtful that the victims, who lacked the political clout to impose a remedy 
through legislation, would have agreed to a Consent Decree that did not contain a 
provision for judicial remedies or equitable enforcement. The length and detail of the 
Consent Decree and settlement agreement belie such an assumption. 
There is, however, a paucity of case law in Maine concerning separation of powers 
and equitable remedies, even if the court should determine a constitutional violation 
of certain defined rights. 145 For several hundred years, the Law Court has avoided the 
139. Id. (citation omitted). 
140. See In re Dunleavy, 2003 ME 124, ,r,i 5-10, 838 A.2d 338, 343-44. 
141. See TINKLE, supra note 129, at 59-60. Article VI, Section I of the Maine Constitution parallels 
Article m of the U.S. Constitution in this manner. See also JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, THE VINEY ARD 
OF LIBERTY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT 38-39 (1982). 
142. TINKLE, supra note 129, at 117. 
143. See, e.g., Statement and Questions Submitted with the Answers of the Supreme Judicial Court 
thereto, 70 Me. 600 (1880); Exparte Davis, 41 Me. 38 (1856). 
144. See POSNER, supra note I 0, at 302 ("As is so often true oflegal decisions, its correctness is political 
rather than epistemic, pragmatic rather than apodictic. "). 
145. But see, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 147 Me. 25, 30, 83 A.2d 213,215 (1951) (holding that the 
Superior Court, "a statutory court upon which the legislature has conferred full equity powers," may enjoin 
enforcement of a law in equity). An intriguing example of separation of powers may be found in Igartua-
Day Li Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005), in which a majority of an en bane panel of the 
First Circuit Court of Appeals held that residents of Puerto Rico had no Constitutional right to participate 
in Presidential elections. Judge Lipez stated that "[i]t may seem odd that a federal court might not have the 
power to answer important legal questions involving interaction between the constitution, international law, 
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controversy surrounding other courts throughout the nation, though it is important to 
remember (and not necessarily self-evident to many) that judicial authority is invoked 
only when parties sue. 146 The lesson for litigants is important. Courts, like legislatures 
and governors, change and shift. Although the Bates analysis may reflect shared values 
that harbor discrimination (and I am certain that is true for the Justices on the Law 
Court), the unwillingness to impose a remedy eviscerated the legitimacy of the Consent 
Decree. 
The roots of this reluctance may be found within the history ofrepublicanism and 
theories of "institutional design" present during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. In Lewis v. Webb, 147 the Law Court held that the Legislature had no 
authority, under the Constitution, to pass any act or resolve granting an appeal or new 
trial in any case between private citizens, as that is a judicial function that the 
Legislature is expressly prohibited from exercising under Article III, Section 2 of the 
Maine Constitution. 
The appellant in Lewis v. Webb argued: 
[Article 3, Section 2) ofour [C]onstitution was substantially the same with that of the 
bill of rights, art. 30, in the [C]onstitution of Massachusetts, under which appeals, 
reviews and new trials had been granted in very many instances . . . . that when a 
similar provision was inserted in the [C)onstitution of this State, it was adopted 
together with its uniform and well known contemporaneous exposition;-and that if 
this exposition was not intended to have been received together with the article, a 
different language would have been used. 148 
In response, the appellee "denied the validity of the resolve [ of the legislature, by 
which the appeal was granted]; maintaining that it was unconstitutional, because it 
disturbed the rights which were already vested under the decree of the Judge of 
Probate,-was retrospective in its operation,-and was in effect a repeal,pro hoc vice, 
of the general laws" and that it is also "a judicial act, and therefore transcends the 
powers of the legislature, to which this authority is expressly interdicted by (Article 3, 
Sections I and 2]." 149 Moreover, appellee argued: 
Any change in the common law course of proceedings in trials was viewed with 
jealousy in England, as early as the reign of Hen. IV .... and all attempts to impair 
the obligation of contracts, or infringe vested rights by legislation, are resisted with 
and the rights of American citizens. But, as I will explain below,one cannot simply go to federal court and 
get an answer to a legal question. Before a federal court can resolve the issues before it, the court must first 
satisfy itself that, at the point of ultimately won, the decision would have probably resulted in a redress of 
the plaintiff's grievance. If a judicial victory would probably not produce such a result, the federal court 
has no power to address the merits of the issues underlying the dispute. In most cases, redressability is not 
a problem. In this case, however, redressability is an insuperable problem." Id at 152-53 (Lipez, J., 
concurring). In a powerful dissent, Judge Torruella noted those citizens who, lacking any political recourse 
"look to the courts of the United States for succor because they are without any other avenue of relief." Id 
at I 59 (Torruella, J., dissenting). 
146. See, e.g., Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Envtl. Improvement Comm'n, 307 A.2d I (Me. 1973), appeal 
dismissed, 414 U.S. 1035 (1973). 
147. 3 Me. 326 (1825). 
148. Id at 327. 
149. Id at 327-28. 
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vigor by the Judges both of that country and of this .... Whatever may have been the 
practice under the colonial charters, in which the legislative and judicial departments 
are frequently confounded, or from whatever causes the same irregularities may have 
been continued under the [C]onstitution of the parent State, the language of our own 
[C]onstitution is too explicit to be misunderstood, and too imperative to be 
disregarded. 150 
In language worthy of quotation, the Law Court held that: 
It seems at the present day to be an· established principle in our country, as well as in 
many other parts of the world, that the three great powers of government, the 
legislative, the executive, and the judicial, should be preserved as distinct from, and 
independent of each other, as the nature of society, human imperfections, and peculiar 
circumstances will admit. And the more this independence of each department, 
within its constitutional limits, can be preserved, the nearer the system will approach 
the perfection of civil government, and the security of civil liberty. Thus the wisdom 
and virtue of society are called upon to give strength and support to this vital 
principle; thereby guarding the system against those disorders and diseases which are 
too apt to endanger its Stability and derange its operations. The science of 
government has gradually become better understood, by a careful attention to the 
lessons of experience; and those who framed the [C]onstitution of the United States 
and of this State have acted under the influence and been guided by the dictates of 
this best of instructors. The same remark is applicable to most of the States in the 
Union} 51 
101 
The Law Court concluded such a law was unreasonable and against the 
Constitutional grant of legislative power: 
We trust there is more harmony than this between the principles of morality and those 
of the constitution and the common law. A law is defined as "a rule of civil 
conduct." ... Hence it must in its nature be general and prospective; a rule for all, and 
binding on all. It is the province of the legislature to make and establish laws; and it 
is the province and duty of judges to expound and apply them. 152 
Thus, the "genius of our government and the nature of our civil institutions are such 
as to render it most proper that all questions between litigating parties should be 
discussed and decided in a judicial Court; there is the place to settle questions of law 
•••• "
153 In profound words, ririging of the Enlightenment, the Law Court wrote: 
All public laws, from their very nature and effects, are to be considered as rules for 
future cases, prescribed for the benefit and regulation of the whole community. Laws 
of this description are considered as the guardians of the life, safety and rights of each 
individual in society. In these, each man has an interest, while they remain in force, 
and on all occasions he may rightfully claim their prot[ e ]ction; and all have an equal 
right to make this claim, and enjoy this protection; because, according to the first 
section in our declaration of rights, "All men are born equally free and independent; 
150. Id at 328 ( citations omitted). 
151. Id at 328-29. 
152. Id. at 333 (citations omitted). For a more recent discussion of this ''rule oflaw," see Coenen, supra 
note 131. 
153. Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326,333 (1825). 
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and have certain natural, inherent and unalienable rights" among which are those of 
enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting 
property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." ... It is our boast that 
we live under a government of laws and not of men. But this can hardly be deemed 
a blessing unless those laws have for their immoveable basis the great principle of 
constitutional equality.154 
V. EQUITY, UNANIMITY, AND JUDICIAL JUSTICE 
Equity as a non-linear concept may well take the form of "dimensions of 
equality." 155 Once a branch of government like the judiciary chooses an equity 
paradigm and the question of security arises, "the central issues are what kind of 
security government should attempt to provide; what kinds ofneeds it should attempt 
to meet; and how the burdens of making security a collective responsibility should be 
distributed." 156 Federal courts have used remedial powers to control state educational 
systems, prisons, mental institutions, and public housing, including the raising oflocal 
property taxes and contempt fines. 157 Federal courts do so in the context of what others 
have termed a structural injunction: 
"The structural suit is one in which a judge, confronting a state bureaucracy over 
values of constitutional dimension, undertakes to restructure the organization to 
eliminate a threat to those values posed by the present institutional arrangements. The 
injunction is the means by which these reconstructive directives are transmitted." In 
this vision, federal courts are both the oracles of public values and the enforcers of 
these values on wayward state bureaucracies.158 
Academics and public officials have criticized federal judges for precisely this 
behavior on several grounds, including that judges are unelected and unaccountable so 
as to purportedly feel little sense of accountability or responsibility when ordering the 
expenditure of state funds. 159 
In Bates, the Law Court avoided any constitutional or political dilemma by 
declining to affirm structural enforcement in the form ofan equitable remedy, whether 
by injunction or receivership. The flaw, however, is that ''the contract" entered into 
by the State allocated the power of enforcement to the judiciary and subjected 
responsible government agencies to equitable sanctions. The Law Court's reluctance 
to encroach on executive authority is an understandably sensitive political response. 
Of course, the victims of more than a decade of violations may believe that the breach 
of such a promise warrants a strong response. The conflict between these public policy 
outcomes (fault but no remedy) arose long ago in the creation of divisions of power 
inherent in a tripartite government schematic. 
154. Id. at 335-36 (quoting Me. Const. art. I,§ 1). 
155. DEBORAH STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING 39 (W. w. Norton 
Co., 3d. ed. 2002) (1988). 
156. Id. at 86. 
157. See Choon Yoo, supra note 135, at 1122. 
158. Id. at 1122-23 (quoting Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of 
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979)). 
159. Id. at 1123. Indeed, the core aspect of Olmstead is really the debate over this element offederalism: 
when can federal courts impose financial burdens on the State? 
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When that branch of government is the judiciary, litigation is the efficient cause, 
and the outcome, or judgment, is the effect. What occurs "in between" is the source 
of much consternation and speculation: the differing roles of judges and lawyers, the 
foibles of human nature, the fallibility of human reasoning, and the choice of decision-
making by a factfinder relying upon information and resource asymmetry between 
parties and the court. 
In the context of probability and pluralism, and the role of interest groups in 
American government, there is no denying that the "legitimacy of public policy 
litigation and of judicial authority to deal with the broad range of issues on balance 
seems more firmly established, and deservedly so, then ever before." 160 For at least the 
past four decades, pluralist democracy has meant that citizens of similar interests 
engage each other in voluntary associations. Given the absence of success at the polls, 
many "previously invisible interest groups have attempted to follow the same path [ via 
litigation] onto the plateau of American politics." 161 
In this context, Bates, and its counterpart in the federal courts, Olmstead, represent 
disparate views of social conservatism and social liberalism: whereas"[ c ]onservatism 
includes beliefs in distributive justice as fair acquisitions ... [l]iberalism includes 
beliefs in distributive justice as fair shares of basic resources." 162 Professor Martha 
Minow would construe these philosophical and political belief systems as the "dilemma 
of difference," meaning that " [ d]ecisions about education, employment, benefits, and 
other opportunities in society should not tum on an individual's ethnicity, disability, 
race, gender, religion, or membership in any other group about which some have 
deprecating or hostile attitudes." 163 This dilemma "may be posed as a choice between 
integration and separation, as a choice between similar treatment and special treatment, 
or as a choice between neutrality and accommodation ... [and] grows from the ways 
in which this society assigns individuals to categories and, on that basis, determines 
whom to include in and whom when to exclude from political, social, and economic 
activities. " 164 
In Olmstead, Justice Thomas advocated an interpretation of the ADA that would 
allow for disparate treatment of individuals who belong to the same protected class in 
certain limited circumstances. 165 Minow would reject this proposition because it fails 
to "confront historical practices" and gives particular significance to differences 
beyond the control of individuals while "leaving the majority free to feel unresponsible 
for and uninvolved in the problems ofdifference." 166 The Olmstead majority may find 
solace in Minow's observation that "[t)he right to be treated as an individual ignores 
the burdens of group membership; the right to object to the burdens of group 
membership reinvokes the trait that carries the negative meanings." 167 Justice 
160. NEIER, supra note 111, at 9. 
161. Id at 13. 
162. STONE, supra note ISS, at 60. 
163. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 
20 (1990). 
I 64. Id. at 20-2 I. 
16S. Olmstead v. L.C., S27 U.S. S81, 616 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
166. MINOW, supra note 163, at 47-48. 
167. Id. at 48. 
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Thomas's dissent in Olmstead, and the Law Court's unanimity in Bates, however, 
ignore the "subtle and complex ways" in which unstated assumptions "contribute to the 
dilemma of difference by frustrating legislative and constitutional commitments to 
change the treatment of differences in race, gender, ethnicity, religion, and 
handicap. " 168 Indeed, it is quite possible to argue that the judicial system abdicates its 
responsibility when it fails to check or monitor other bodies of government, so as to 
afford some level of equity and security to the mentally disabled. 
The legitimacy of claims to authority, Max Weber taught us, may rest on rational-
legal grounds, in which authority is accepted because the public believes in the 
legality of rules and in the legal right of those in authority to enforce the rules; on 
traditional grounds, in which authority is accepted because it has been validated by 
time, that is, we do things in a certain way because things have always been done that 
way; and on charismatic grounds, in which authority is accepted because of the 
exemplary character or heroic qualities of the individual exercising authority. 169 
The function of a system of separation of powers, undergirded by a social contract, 
therefore, needs to sustain a broad consensus sufficient to "guarantee[] that contentious 
issues can be readily revisited." 170 
The nexus of equity and security has tangible meaning only if there is a legal 
instrument or mechanism for imposing on the nominal majority a tum for the mentally 
disabled. One of the problems of equity in a majority-rule system (one person-one 
vote) is that the have-nots are frequently left to divvy up one cake (as Deborah Stone 
metaphorically writes) 171 among the disenfranchised while 100 cakes are available to 
the rest of normal society. If an entrenched majority of the polis and their 
representatives refuse to allocate sufficient funds or bureaucratic willpower to serve 
the more expansive, community-based needs of an underempowered class, and the 
mentally disabled suffer from such a litany of stigma, bigotry, and personal limitations, 
then they are truly disenfranchised. 
A citizen, irrespective of their locus within society, has a right to actively and 
respectfully participate in legislative and political process with their voices heard 
equitably (not equally) so as to at least attempt to persuade someone of the legitimacy 
of their position. Even if the separation of powers doctrine and notions of equity exist 
within a framework that is "inevitably disjointed and lurching," 172 they may still assure 
that the prospects of revolution and tyranny are diminished. The difference, however, 
is the distinction between judicial supremacy and judicial sovereignty. 173 
David Truman aptly defined the institution of government and its interest-based 
connections as "latent," with their activities ranging in "political character from the 
routinized and widely accepted to the unstable and highly controversial." 174 In the 
168. Id. at 74. 
169. NEIER, supra note 111, at 14. 
170. Peabody & Nugent, supra note 17, at 44. 
171. STONE, supra note 155, at 39. 
172. Peabody & Nugent, supra note 17, at 44 
173. LarryD. Kramer, The Supreme Court Two Thousand Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. 
L. REV. 4, 13 (2001). 
174. DAVID TRUMAN, THE GoVERNMENT AL PROCESS: PoLmCAL INTEREST AND Pueuc OPINION 506 
(1951). 
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AMHI case, a visible pattern of government institutions and interest-groups did evolve 
over time and now represent complex cross-relationships serving multiple or 
overlapping membership. At its most basic, pluralism recognizes that when such large 
numbers of such competing groups co-exist in a complex nation like the United States, 
''the forms and functions of government in tum are a reflection of the activities and 
claims of such groups. The constitution-writing proclivities of Americans clearly 
reveal the influence of demands from such sources, and the statutory creation of new 
functions reflects their continuing operation." 175 In this pluralistic sense, AMHI 
conforms with what Truman would aptly adopt from Federalist No. IO in which 
Madison wrote, "I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority 
or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of 
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and 
aggregate interests of the comrnunity." 176 
Other authors posit that the cost and benefits of government action-and whether 
it falls in a concentrated or defused way--determines the type of political contest it 
engenders. These authors assert that "the function of the implementation process is to 
satisfy the psychological and social needs of the participants, regardless of the actual 
policy results. " 177 A corollary to this theory is that implementation and progress is not 
linear but a dynamic non-linear evolution that learns, evolves, and adapts. The initial 
point of departure does not define the political, social, human, and institutional systems 
and sub-systems that will alter the original purpose of a government activity, like 
operation of mental health systems. When there is litigation, the flexing of judicial 
authority as equity will determine if the outcome is distributive, regulatory, or 
transformative. 
A branch of theorists argues for a new practical and philosophical construct of 
democratic experimentations that transform courts, agencies, legislatures, and public 
institutions. This construct "include[s] (1) problem-oriented pragmatism; (2) 
coordinated decentralization; (3) participatory transparency; and (4) collaboration as 
a premise for political action ofall kinds." 178 In a similar manner, author James Wilson 
suggests that most of the major social programs in the United States were "initially 
adopted by broad coalitions appealing to general standards of justice or to conceptions 
of the public weal." 179 Wilson's concept of"bureaucratic clientelism" falls within the 
famous definition of politics as the art and science of''who gets what in society." 180 
The concept of clientelism was first elaborated by anthropologists and sociologists to 
describe the hierarchical social relations that have long marked societies. Social 
scientists found that clientelism, also known as the patron-client model of politics, 
permeated contemporary political systems around the world, when three features exist: 
175. Id at 505-06. 
176. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 54 (James Madison) (Robert Scigliano ed., Random House, Inc. 2000). 
177. Giandomenico Majone & Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation as Evolution, in THE PUBLIC POLICY: 
THE ESSENTIAL READINGS 143 (Theodoulou & Matthew A. Cahn eds., 1995). 
178. Jamison E. Bolbum, Democratic Experimentation: A Separation of Powers, 3 7 SUFFOLK U. L.REv. 
287, 288 (2004). 
179. James Q. Wilson, The Rise of the Bureaucratic State, in THE PuBLIC POLICY: THE ESSENTIAL 
READINGS 143 (Theodoulou & Matthew A. Cahn eds., 1995). 
180. Id. at 256-58. 
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(1) the relationship between parties of unequal power and status; (2) a principle of 
reciprocity that maintains or terminates rewards; and (3) the relationship is particular 
and anchored in public law or community norms. 181 
Essentially, government-sponsored institutions such as AMHI that are often the 
product of a specific political culture created ( or at least tolerated) by polity may well 
be resistant to political, social, or bureaucratic change. This tends to perpetuate across 
time as inertia, which prevents innovation. There is, however, a critical, long-standing 
issue, though it is often spoken of in a whispered tone. Judges can enter orders of 
equity thereby transforming pleas for relief into action, which is not a novel concept 
for scholars: 
State officials other than judges have no direct, legal checks on Supreme Court power. 
Nullification has been tried on a number of occasions and has sometimes been 
successful, but the development of American constitutional law has branded this as 
an heretical doctrine. State politicians, however, do have important means of 
restricting federal judicial power. Like federal officials, state officers may drag their 
heels and refuse to co-operate in carrying out the Court's decisions. More 
dramatically, state officers may throw their prestige against the Court and on an issue 
of local significance, such as school segregation, may so stir public opinion as to 
make the Court's policy practically unworkable. Furthermore, since federalism is as 
strong an aspect of the American political party system as it is of the formal 
governmental structure, state politicians can bring heavy pressure to bear at the 
national level both on legislators and administrators to use their weapons against the 
Court or at least to withhold their support from the Court or from those groups likely 
to benefit from Court decisions. 
Political officials may fight particular decisions or even judicial power itself for 
a wide combination of reasons. They may disagree sincerely with the wisdom of the 
public policies which the Court seems to be following. They may feel their own 
policy-making prerogatives threatened by judicial action. Then, too, political 
officials, lacking the job security of Supreme Court Justices, may be reacting to the 
pressures of organized interest groups or broader constituent sentiment. Interest-
group leaders are quick to utilize such instruments of the judicial process as the 
injunction and the class action when they believe the judiciary will serve their goals 
against other groups who may be benefiting from legislative or administrative 
policies. These same leaders are equally quick to complain to congressmen and 
executive officials when they feel their own interests are impaired by court decisions. 
Spokesmen for respected groups like the American Bar Association, the National 
Association of Manufacturers, or the Chamber of Commerce, can also effectively 
attack the Court's prestige. 182 
Echoing Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 78, John Marshall asserted that 
judicial function involves an exercise of judgment, not of will. 183 Similarly, John 
Rawls believed that justice's primary subject was the basic structure of society, 
specifically the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights 
and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation: 
181. Id. 
182. WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 27-28 (1964). 
183. Id. at 16. Chief Justice Marshall was well-familiar with the works of the Enlightenment. See JEAN 
Eow ARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 78 ( 1996). 
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[T]he guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the basic structure of society are 
the object of the original agreement. They are the principles that free and rational 
persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of 
equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association. These principles are 
to regulate all further agreements; they specify the kinds of social cooperation that can 
be entered into and the forms of government that can be established. This way of 
regarding the principles of justice I shall call justice as fairness.'"" 
107 
When Rawls discussed the concept of Pareto efficiency or optimality, he did so 
not in terms of whether or not one person can be made better off without making 
another worse off, but in terms of"a representative man." 185 Rawls pointed out, using 
the example of serfdom, that generally there will be many Pareto-efficient states, and 
some will be prima facie unjust: "[I]t may be that under certain conditions serfdom 
cannot be significantly reformed without lowering the expectations of some 
representative man, say, [those] oflandowners, in which case serfdom is efficient." 186 
In this regard, and more than forty years ago, authors James Buchanan and Gordon 
Tullock wrote: 
[P]olitical theorists, by contrast, do not seem to have considered fully the implications 
of individual differences for a theory of political decisions. Normally, the choice-
making process has been conceived of as the means of arriving at some version of 
''truth," some rationalist absolute which remains to be discovered through reason or 
revelation, and which, once discovered, will attract all men to its support. The 
conceptions of rationalist democracy have been based on the assumption that 
individual conflicts of interest will, and should, vanish once the electorate becomes 
fully informed.187 
As they assert, "the attainment of consent is a costly process, however, and a 
recognition of this simple fact points directly toward an 'economic' theory of 
constitutions." 188 Thus, an individual ''will find it advantageous to agree in advance 
to certain rules ( which he knows may work occasionally to his own disadvantage) when 
the benefits are expected to exceed the costs." 189 Meanwhile, an individual's 
economic interests "[provide] an explanation for the emergence of a political 
constitution from the discussion process conducted by free individuals attempting to 
formulate generally acceptable rules in their own long-term interest." 190 
184. Eow ARD E. 'ZAJAC, POLITICAL ECONOMY OFF AIRNESS 82 ( 1995) (quoting JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY 
OF JUSTICE 11 (Harvard Univ. Press 1971) (emphasis added). 
185. Id. 
186. Id. (quoting JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (Harvard Univ. Press 1971)). Rawls has 
critics. See generally BRIAN BARRY, THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE 
PRINCIPLE THEORIES IN A THEORY OF JUSTICE BY JOHN RAWLS 27 (1973). 
187. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GoRDON TuLLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LoGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 4 (1965). See generally Michael Brooks, Some Reflections on the 
Calculus of Consent, 8 CONST. POL. ECON. 3 (1997) (discussing the economic theory of Buchanan and 
Tullock's book). 
188. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 187, at 7. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
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Much of this analysis rests within two concepts of public choice and distributive 
justice, one based on the criteria of merit, and the other on the criteria of need. The 
relationship, however, is, more multi-lateral in the sense of an evolving, fluid, and 
dynamic exchange of ideas and program development within the political and 
constitutional sphere. If Buchanan and Tullock are correct, but the public yearns for 
freedom defined by a theocracy or oligarchy, the judicial branch of government 
provides an answer that still fits for the polis within constitutional precepts of freedom 
as inherently possessed by polis. 
For example, author Samuel Beer's notion of ''tightly knit oligarchies, 
subordinating pluralism to a new kind of structure control over policies and programs" 
may portend a metaphorically accurate iron law of oligarchy as a "new localism" if the 
judiciary imposes equity that is unacceptable to the polis or its legislative 
representatives. 191 When calculating consent, however, the judiciary poses a problem 
because unanimity, as asserted by Buchanan and Tullock, is a unique exercise in 
"costs" and "gains" imposed by will, tradition, or charisma. If equity or efficiency, in 
political or economic terms, is defined by an active or monolithic authority to 
determine "what is," unanimity is easy if it requires "one vote." But enforcement of 
unanimity in a complex democracy may require acceptance that the polis chooses to 
be served by litigation rather than representative decision-making influenced by active 
interest groups, elitists, or neo-pluralism writ small. 192 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Thus, we end with a question, which though less than heartening, invites reflection 
on Enlightenment thought: 
What, then, is America's place in the Enlightenment? The question is as ambiguous 
as the many-sided facts from which it abstracts. One might wonder, whose America? 
Thomas Jefferson's or the Connecticut clergy's? Alexander Hamilton's or George 
Mason's? And whose Enlightenment? John Locke's or Beccaria's? David Hume's 
or Condorcet's? Nor is it obvious what one means by "place." 193 
The history of the U.S. Constitution, and its precursors in the Articles of 
Confederation and the Declaration of Independence, has a real connection to state 
government, the development of state constitutions, and the exercise of judicial 
supremacy during this century. The difference may be found in the kinds of disputes 
that may now arise in state courts rather than federal courts. The past exercise of 
federal judicial power to enforce social justice, however defined, often blunted the will 
of the popular majority. Without too much oversimplification, the three branches of 
state government and the doctrine of the separation of powers have a more profound 
local effect on the purse, social policy, and the distribution of social resources. 194 
191. Samuel H. Beer, The Modernization of American Federalism, in THE FEDERAL POLITY 49, 95 
(Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1974). 
192. But see Michael Lind, In Defense of Mandarins, PROSPECT, Oct. 2005. 
193. RALPH LERNER, REVOLUTION REVISITED: Two FACES OF THE POLITICS OF ENLIGHTENMENT 22 
(1994). 
194. See RADIN, supra note 10, at 92 ("At the most basic level, it is important to remember ... that 
policy analysis is political argument and that policy conflicts are produced by political conflicts."). 
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Consent decrees related to institutionalization implicate constitutional issues that 
directly impose rights that are meaningless if the courts so choose. For all the 
agitation, state courts can elect to plead with the legislature rather than impose an 
equitable remedy. When a receiver is necessary to run a municipality, school, or 
institution, this action creates substantial, often rapid, changes in governmental roles 
as a function of constitutional prerogatives within a representative democracy. At the 
state level, the death penalty, marriage, education, right to life or living are profoundly 
present in modem litigation. 195 For those who track human nature, money-and the 
allocation of the public treasury~reates even more friction because it commands and 
confers respect, power, control, status, and fear. 
Maine's judiciary has avoided the harsh rhetoric of other states but that is more 
fortuitous than planned. 196 When there is a quest, sought by those outside the levels 
of power to impose an expenditure of resources to protect themselves, as with the 
AMHI Consent Decree, there is no public or political immunity from the tension of 
unanimity of one. 
As to the traction and consequences of a judicial theocracy at the state level and 
its impact on the separation of powers doctrine-these cases often arise at the state 
level because of inaction by the other branches of government toward a displaced 
minority without access to the leverages of power. Courts do not select litigation, 
people do. People with motives and aspirations, feelings, and narcissistic injuries, real 
or imagined, use the court system as a means of gaining traction for personal gain, 
altruistic motives, or political views, with causes common across all political 
spectrums. The process oflitigation, however, allows all parties to do "something" as 
a response to some form of pluralistic or interest-group pressure. This does not lessen 
the perception of judicial activism when interpreting the "law" or the "constitution." 
But a careful reading of most criticisms reveals that the complaint is more about the 
relief (outcome) than the "political" theory that underscored the judgment. 
At the same time, most people of power arise from the same club of political elites 
or activists-all politics is personal. The powers of courts have derived, like modern 
referendums, whenever the polity or other branches of government have found it 
convenient. Much like family courts as a model of the therapeutic justice, 197 the public 
has been taught that courts exist to provide a solution (and scapegoat) for life's ills. 
Thus, the judicial system resolves complex political and cultural issues in our modem 
times. This evolution should not be surprising to anyone familiar with history for it is 
human nature to seek an outcome based upon faith more than reason. Such an outcome 
is not necessarily premised upon natural rights or a particular theology, but that there 
is some individual, conferred with authority by the social contract, to be blamed while 
195. See generally David Chump, How Do Courts Really Discover Unenumerated Fundamental 
Rights? Cataloguing the Methods of Judicial Alchemy, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 795 (1996). 
196. See Theresa A. Laurie, Bates and Olmstead: Court-initiated Strategies to Implement Community 
Inclusion of Persons with Psychiatric and Other long-term Disabilities, ME. POL'Y REV. 68 
Spring/Summer 2004, at 68, 68. 
197. See generally Daniel W. Shuman, Troxel v. Granville and the Boundaries of Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 67 (2003). 
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accepting responsibility for making choices. For those individuals or groups, the 
judge's role is to personify justice: 98 
Thus, a doctrine of separation of powers may be formulated from the premise that 
it is essential for the establishment and maintenance of political harmony that 
government be divided into identifiable, functional (or functionalist) parts. In this 
sense, the Constitution reflects the law's boundedness as it is part inspirational and part 
procedural. The themes that transform these thoughts into practice have many mid-
wives. 199 As reflected in the Maine Constitution, and other state constitutions, separa-
tion of powers has an explicit purpose. 200 The fact that state constitutions are so much 
more specific may also reflect the political reality of proximity at the time of creation. 
There is always a certain counterintuitiveness to this fact, but just as proximity can 
lead to more kindness in the form of altruism among kin, so can personal proximity 
yield a level of political altruism sustained by personal observations of character and 
behavior. Stated another way, the political realities of criticizing those elected to 
Washington, with whom one may have no personal interaction, is quite different at the 
municipal and state level where personalities and personal relationships may well 
generate a higher degree of concern, with attention that is both complementary and 
distrustful. The crux is that the philosophical and historical grounding of the 
separation of powers doctrine was crafted with a profound sense of that history as a 
human and political reality. 
The founding fathers lived during a time in which life was much harsher in many 
respects, even among those who constituted the aristocracy. The computer, the car, air 
travel, medicines, technology, indoor heat, and vacuum cleaners were non-existent. 
Life could be brutal and short. War was not fought by laser but near home. Travel was 
distant and communication complex. Death occurred suddenly and often violently. 
In the context of the times during which the founding fathers lived, distrust for all of 
human frailties and the fallacies of government existed, and profoundly impacted the 
perspective of those charged with a distrust of some forms of government. It is within 
this context that the how and why of constitutional provisions occur, with social 
contracts crafted and evolving in the midst of an enlightened revolution, whether 
political, social, or scientific. 201 Bates and the AMHI Consent Decree reflect but a 
piece of those consequences three to four centuries later. The rest of the story, as state 
courts continue to act as laboratories for delivering social justice to families and 
members of the disenfranchised, may yield a modem social contract of a dimension 
and consequence only yet on the horizon. 
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